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Abstract: is paper tries to build on traditional value capturemeasures, to estimate the potential of some of thesemechanisms for the Lisbon
subway by examining their ability to mitigate the system’s operation and development costs. e study focus is on the municipality of Lisbon
where this system mainly operates. is research uses spatial hedonic pricing models of the real estate of the region, calibrated on previous
stages of the study, to assess the extent to which transportation infrastructure is currently capitalized into the real estate market. e paper uses
a Monte Carlo simulation procedure to estimate a synthetic population of residential and non-residential properties that matches the census
blocks statistics, measuring the subway valuation for each synthetic property and aggregating the results for the whole municipality. is po-
tential value capture estimate is then used to estimate an annual tax that could be charged under diﬀerent value capturemeasure conﬁgurations
(i.e., land value tax, special assessment). e results suggest that there is signiﬁcant potential for the use of this instrument to ﬁnance the subway
infrastructure.
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1 Introduction
Most of the cities across the world are currently facing chal-
lenges in ﬁnancing public transport. For several decades now,
Urban Public Transport (UPT) has been unable to collect
enough revenues from clients to cover its production costs.
e fact that public transit is seen as an indispensable service
in all medium and large cities, accompanied by the operating
constraints and the multiple (and sometimes conﬂicting) ob-
jectives under which it performs, have largely prevented radi-
cal political moves to force its cost coverage to be more in line
with the normal market economy (Viegas 2005).
Parallelwith theseﬁnancial diﬃculties, the service provided
byUPT, even with younger ﬂeets andmore comfortable vehi-
cles, has not been attractive enough to resist the higher avail-
ability and comfort provided by the private car. us the
long termmarket share of UPT has been declining in all cities
around the world, with only a few recent short term excep-
tions. e ﬁnancing problem of UPT, partly explained by
this loss of competitiveness and patronage, is accompanied by
the problem of generally low quality and sustainability (Vie-
gas 2005).
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Furthermore, accessibility to desired destinations tends to
play a major role in location decisions of activities and resi-
dential location, which raises land value in highly accessible
locations. e monetary value of this accessibility is reﬂected
in the value of a home or a business, in addition to the value
of other features such as the speciﬁc physical attributes of the
building and neighborhood characteristics (Lari et al. 2009).
Value capture then arises as the process whereby a funding
agency (i.e., the city, the region, or the state) attempts to re-
cover a share of the value added to property resulting from any
infrastructure development (Hass-Klau 2006).
is paper examines the value capture potential of Lisbon’s
subway by testing several diﬀerent mechanisms, and looks at
its integration with the current ﬁscal system in order to de-
velop a newﬁnancing framework for the systemoperation and
infrastructure development within the municipality of Lis-
bon.
is study uses a Monte Carlo simulation procedure in or-
der to estimate a synthetic market composition of the residen-
tial, retail, and oﬃce sectors from the aggregated statistical
data available at city block level, leading to an estimate of the
value capture potential of the subway in the Lisbon munici-
pality.
e potential value capture estimate is then analyzed in or-
der to extract an annual tax for dwellings and commercial ar-
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eas that could be charged as diﬀerent types of annual taxes to
property owners. is annual potential revenue is compared
with the annual ﬁnancial cost of the subway infrastructure op-
eration and development, allowing a ﬁrst insight on the value
capture impact on the ﬁnancial infrastructure development.
Finally, the estimated tax is compared with the existing mu-
nicipal LandValueTax (LVT) in order to analyze the viability
of its integration with the current ﬁscal system.
2 A brief review of current practice in ﬁnancing
transport infrastructure
e funding of transport projects in most developed coun-
tries has become increasingly complex since the SecondWorld
War. In the early post-war period transport infrastructure
projects were primarily funded through national government,
with contributions sought by users either directly or indirectly
(e.g., fares, petrol taxes, vehicle registration duty, etc.). e fo-
cus of such investment was more inclined to road and airport
schemes, rather than railways (which had a highly used and
well developed infrastructure in good alignment with stable
vehicle technology) and non-mechanized forms of transport
(GVAGrimley 2004).
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the expenditure of the
public transport sector in the United States. e ﬁgure shows
strong growth in the total expenditures of the transport sec-
tor since 1970, while the commercial revenues, including the
charged fares, have stalled. is fact has generated a parallel
growth in subsidies paid by public funds, substantially increas-
ing public obligation to support the development, operation,
and maintenance of transport infrastructures. A similar trend
has been observed in Europe (see Table 1) and other devel-
oped countries, increasing the need of introducing alternative
sources of funding, oen closer to the beneﬁciary-pays princi-
ple.
From the viewpoint of the burden theory of ﬁnancial re-
sources, the question of who should pay is of deep concern,
and is related to the most basic questions of how to assess the
role and purpose of transport improvements. If the paradigm
is that improvements will only result in increased user conve-
nience, then users should bear the cost. However, transporta-
tion systems are not only part of the social infrastructure for all
industries and activities, but also have a social welfare dimen-
sion in ensuring freedom of movement for all. In addition,
there may be external eﬀects such as capital gains accruing to
local land owners. Finally, the question of ﬁnancing is com-
plicated by such issues as the external costs of environmental
Table 1: Summary of the percentage of revenue of European
public transport operators received from subsidies or
grants.
Country
Number
of cities
Average percentage
of revenue from
subsidies or grants
Austria 3 32
Belgium 3 61
Croatia 1 23
Czech 3 65
Denmark 1 36
Finland 1 51
France 7 44
Germany 21 47
Greece 1 22
Hungary 1 28
Italy 4 7
Netherlands 2 67
Norway 1 3
Poland 4 47
Portugal 2 2
Romania 2 59
Sweden 1 52
Switzerland 3 35
Yugoslavia 1 41
Source: Reynolds-Feighan et al. (2000).
impact and the need to distribute the burden across genera-
tions (Nakagawa andMatsunaka 1997).
Over the last 20 years there has been an increasing shi
towards deregulation of public transport, allied with encour-
agement of private sector involvement in transport project
funding, and even design, construction, and operation (Vivier
1999; Worsey 2005). e main forms of direct private sector
involvement in terms of funding transport schemes has been
through Private Finance Initiative (PFI)/Public-private part-
nership (PPP) contracts, Design, Build, Finance, andOperate
(DBFO) contracts, and direct equity funding. In addition,
European governments can apply for grants from the Euro-
pean Union to promote this type of ﬁnancing scheme, as well
as access other funding streams set up by the European Com-
mission (Faber 2000).
e current pressure over public investment in transporta-
tion infrastructure led governments toward a mixed use of
these methods, and the consideration of various alternative
sources of funding to supplement government ﬁnancing for
transport through the annual government budgets, or even to
replace it (Berry and Sims 1999; Godier 2002; Simon 1999;
Ubbels and Nijkamp 2002).
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Figure 1:United States public transport expenditures, subsidies and passenger usage since the 1970s. Source: (Wendell Cox Con-
sultancy 2006).
In this context, alternative public transport funding meth-
ods have been introduced in some countries. Some of the al-
ternative methods are focused on the implementation of land
value capture mechanisms which try to recoup part of the
value added by transportation improvements that oen pro-
duce proﬁt windfalls for land and property owners.
To date, most studies of value capture ﬁnancing for pub-
lic transport have focused on cities in developed countries,
where low density development and automobile dependency
predominate. Studies have begun to emerge from develop-
ing countries, where denser cities and a more even modal split
can be found, like Jakarta (Cervero and Susantono 1999), Bo-
gota (Rodriguez and Targa 2004), Uruguay (Prest 1969), and
studies for several developing countries at once (Nakagawa
and Matsunaka 1997; Tsukada and Kuranami 1990). Some
of these authors have noted that while progressive legislation
may exist, the practical means of capturing site values for pub-
lic transport projects is hampered by inadequate land registra-
tion records and lagging assessments.
Table 2 presents a summary of value capture techniques that
have been applied around the world, where the main advan-
tages anddisadvantages of eachmechanism are analyzed based
on a RICS report about London’s transport funding (GVA
Grimley 2004), among other studies.
3 Methodology
is study presents severalmodels in order to estimate the cur-
rent value capture potential of the subway system and to deter-
mine how this value capture potential could be linked to the
current land value tax ﬁscal system.
Two diﬀerent types of synthetic properties simulation
models were developed to estimate the attributes of the exist-
ing real estate stock, one based on hedonic prices and another
based on land value tax legislation. e former estimates the
market value of that stock and the value capture potential of
the subway, whereas the latter estimates its asset value used to
determine the annual land value tax.
esemodels will allow estimation of the annual value cap-
ture charge for the diﬀerentmechanisms tested, and of the ad-
ditional tax burden that would be generated by their applica-
tion to property owners.
e value capture policies tested in the study were:
1. a Special Assessment (SA) tax, which would be imple-
mented in a deﬁned impact area close to the subway sta-
tions;
2. the integration of a value capture tax with the current
land value tax.
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Table 2: Innovative funding methods for transport infrastructure.
FundingMethod Focus Funding Source Advantages Disadvantages
Land Value Taxation
(LVT)/Site Value
Rating
Beneﬁciary pays Land/Property
Property-related
taxes
Encourages appropriate
development. Landowners
who see a fall in value are
compensated.
Regular valuations required.
Initial data collection.
Requires primary legislation.
Case studies: Most general type of value capture policy applied widely around the world for general public
goods provision (variations: split rate property tax).
Tax Incremental
Financing
(TIF)/LRTP
Development-
based, Beneﬁciary
pays
Land/Property
Property-related
taxes
Defers payment from
business. Can stimulate new
development. Does not
require primary legislation.
Cannot guarantee
development. Funding can
also be slow to come forward.
Case studies: Widespread adoption in many US states. In Chicago, TIF districts have been established to
support the construction of subway/elevated stations near the CBD (McGreal et al. 2002). Portland, Oregon
has also promoted TIF districts to support streetcar and light rail development (Dueker and Bianco 1999).
Adoption in other cities for urban regeneration processes not related to transport (e.g. Dublin) (McGreal et al.
2002).
Special Assessments
(SA)/Business
Improvement
Districts
Development-
based, Beneﬁciary
pays
Land/Property
Property-related
taxes
Does not require primary
legislation. Can increase
public-private cooperation.
Diﬃcult boundary deﬁnition
and business inclusion.
Payment levels can be
diﬃcult to structure. Seen as
an extra tax.
Case studies: Created in the United States and Canada (Hass-Klau 2006). In Los Angeles a variation of this
tax known as “Special Assessment Districts” was introduced. is tax feeds a share of the increase in property
values associated with a newly established rail line (typically on sites within 400–800 m of the stations) back
into funding the public transport system (Doherty 2004).
Transportation Utility
Fees
Beneﬁciary pays Transportation is
seen as a
utility/Transport-
demand-related
Potentially eﬃcient to
ﬁnance local transport by
shiing cost burden to
residents and commercial
and industrial properties.
Stable source of funding.
Regular valuations required
based on trip generation rates
for diﬀerent properties (i.e.
Trip Generation Handbook).
Initial data collection.
Requires primary legislation.
Case studies: US examples in Colorado, Oregon, and Texas (Lari et al. 2009).
Development Impact
Fees
Beneﬁciary pays One-time charges Improved eﬃciency in
resource allocation in local
governments.
Narrow revenue capabilities.
Problems with ability to pay
in low-income locations.
Case studies: ere are several examples throughout the United States, especially in fast growing areas such as
California, Florida and Texas (Doherty 2004).
Continued
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Table 2: Innovative funding methods for transport infrastructure (Continued).
FundingMethod Focus Funding Source Advantages Disadvantages
Joint Development
Beneﬁciary pays Land/Property
Development land
charges
Seen as a “proactive” tool in
which those who are
prepared to invest see
increased opportunity to
obtain beneﬁts.
May only secure relatively
small levels of revenue.
Would require changes to
Local Plans/UDPs.
Case studies: Applied in the spatially coincidental developments of transport facilities and private real estate
development (Lari et al. 2009).
Business Rate Levy Beneﬁcary pays Land/Property
Property-related
taxes
Diﬃcult to avoid, and
business rating list is regularly
updated. Value changes are
self-adjusted changes.
Tenants charged twice
eﬀectively. Payers do not see
any direct beneﬁt in land
values, unless an owner
occupier.
Case studies: Applied in London to fund Crossrail operations (Lari et al. 2009).
Greenﬁeld
Development Tax
Beneﬁciary pays Land/Property
Property-related
taxes
Encourages development in
more sustainable locations.
e tax-service the
development link.
May be diﬃcult to deﬁne
“Greenﬁeld” sites. May
encourage development
activity to other
areas/regions. Would require
legislation in some form.
Case studies: Several US cities have applied this tax to control urban sprawl (Whelan et al. 2003).
Betterment Levy/
Freehold Levy
Beneﬁciary pays Land/Property
Development land
charges
Charges based on sale price
are easy to collect. Concept
simple to understand.
Would penalize those who
lost value as a result of the
scheme. Would require
legislation.
Case studies: A levy on freehold property in a speciﬁc area. e levy is applied to the upli in property values
as a one-oﬀ charge. Applied in UK cities (GVAGrimley 2004; Lari et al. 2009).
Planning Gain/Tariﬀs
Beneﬁciary pays Land/Property
Development land
charges
Diﬃcult to avoid as
development requires
planning consent. Relatively
straightforward and
understood.
Section 106 agreements
would happen anyway.
Restricting use of funds to
transport schemes.
Case studies: ismechanismwas introduced due to the lack of funds in German cities at the end of the 1980s
to pay infrastructure costs generated by the designation of urban land use (Hold 2004). Other examples are
Section 106 in the UK and the Section 94 in Australia (Glaister and Graham 2005; Hass-Klau et al. 2004).
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4 Market value estimation model
4.1 Model data
e synthetic properties model developed to assess value cap-
ture potential is based on spatial hedonic pricing models de-
veloped and calibrated in previous stages of our research. e
variables required for each property are classiﬁed into three
types: structural attributes of the properties (e.g., number of
bedrooms, age, and existence of oﬀ-street parking facilities in-
side the property); neighborhood attributes, which include
some indicators that characterize the vicinity of the property
and measure their inﬂuence in the property price (i.e., educa-
tion level indicator Educational Index or land use mixture in-
dicator Entropy Index); and accessibility attributes that mea-
sure the inﬂuence of proximity to diﬀerent types of transport
infrastructure on property prices, including:
 proximity to subway stations, measured by a decreasing
impedance function, using as argumentwalking distance
to the two closest subway lines 2MAccess, and to the clos-
est subway line 1MAccess;
 proximity to diﬀerent levels of the road network, mea-
sured by a decreasing continuous impedance function,
using as argument the Euclidean distance to the clos-
est node of the three main levels of urban road hierar-
chy: road hierarchy level 1 (motorways)Network1, road
hierarchy level 2 (urban ring roads and radial network)
Network2, and road hierarchy level 3 (urban distribution
network)Network3;
 proximity to commuter rail stations, measured also by a
decreasing continuous impedance function, using as ar-
gument the walking access time to the closest stations of
the commuter lines of Sintra (Sintra) and Cascais (Cas-
cais).
ese models use a semi-logarithmic speciﬁcation with a
spatial lag term as presented in Equation 1. e speciﬁcation
of the attributes of the models and their resulting coeﬃcients
are presented in Table 3.
ln(Pi ) = Wln(Pi )+0+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e data used to calibrate this model were obtained from
an online realtor, the dependent variable being the advertised
price at which the owner or realtor is oﬀering the property.
is can be a limitation to the model because the dependent
variable is not directly linked to an equilibrium price, where
supply and demand have cleared the transaction (Rodríguez
and Mojica 2007). Other studies that relate public transport
accessibility to residential property or land values also have re-
lied on asking prices (Benjamin and Sirmans 1996; Cheshire
and Sheppard 2003; Du andMulley 2007;Henneberry 1998;
Rodriguez andTarga 2004; Rodríguez andMojica 2007). We
hadno access to the transactionprice, butwe also seeno reason
why the discrepancy between the asking price and the transac-
tion price should be related to location in general, or to prox-
imity to a subway station in particular.
e development of the synthetic properties model re-
quired a comprehensive data collection process, including:
1. Census data on building and dwelling characteristics at
city census block level for the characterization of the resi-
dentialmarket. e census data allowed the deﬁnition of
statistical distributions for the diﬀerent structural prop-
erty attributes of dwellings, and at the same time, con-
trolled the total number of properties that exist at each
census block.
2. Land use data on activities (oﬃces, retail, and ware-
houses) for the Lisbon municipality, collected from
the Portuguese Yellow Pages (http://www.pai.pt). is
database contains all businesses that have been assigned
ﬁxed (landline) telephone numbers, which might ex-
clude some activities that rely only on mobile phone ser-
vices. Nevertheless, this sample was used to characterize
the retail, oﬃce, and warehouse market due to a lack of
better data.
3. A real estate cross-sectional database of 2007 from an
online realtor’s database (Imokapa Vector) for Lisbon,
Portugal. is database presents the asking price of res-
idential properties for sale during February 2007 with
a total of 8742 complete records, and 1165 complete
records for non residential properties, including retail,
oﬃce, and warehouse properties. e real estate data
contained information on their asking price, structural
attributes, and address.
e neighborhood properties and the local accessibility at-
tributes for residential and non-residential properties were
computed considering as reference the centroid of each cen-
sus block (normally smaller than 1 ha), as well as the spatial
lag term, considering the real estate data available for Lisbon
city, with an inﬂuence area threshold of 500 m.
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Table 3: Summary of the hedonic price models used for property value estimation.
Residential model (Martínez and Viegas 2009) Retail & oﬃce model (Martínez 2010)
Variables Coef. Std. Error Variables Coef. Std. Error
SP_LAG_LOGPRICE 0.3561*** 0.0085 SP_LAG_LOGPRICE 0.0394*** 0.0088
Constant 6.9089*** 0.0999 Constant 10.264 *** 0.1143
Structural attributes
Bedrooms 0.0427*** 0.003 Store 0.4147*** 0.0446
House 0.1685*** 0.0154 Oﬃce 0.3892*** 0.053
Floor 0.0155*** 0.0009 Floor 0.0227** 0.0108
Area 0.0064*** 0.0001 Area1 0.0079*** 0.0002
Area2 0.0018*** 0.0001
Area3 0.0005*** 0.0001
Age2 −0.1034*** 0.0063 Age2 −0.1775*** 0.0281
Age3 −0.0729*** 0.0068 Age3 −0.156 *** 0.0263
Garage 0.1126*** 0.0059 Garage 0.1316*** 0.0344
Neighborhood attributes
Educational Index 0.416 *** 0.0225 Educational Index 0.9892*** 0.0939
Entropy Index 0.2312*** 0.0234 Shopping Center 0.2308 0.1518
Accessibility Attributes
2MAccess 0.0916*** 0.0133 2MAccess 0.2163*** 0.0466
1Maccess 0.0652*** 0.0084 1Maccess 0.0918** 0.0357
Network1 −0.0732*** 0.0069 Network1 −0.127 *** 0.036
Network2 0.0458*** 0.0064 Network2 0.1029*** 0.0302
Network3 −0.038 *** 0.006
Sintra −0.0614*** 0.0134
Cascais 0.1517*** 0.0259
Pseudo R2 0.795 Pseudo R2 0.76
LM statistic 1154.496 *** LM statistic 19.940 ***
Log likelihood 236.608 Log likelihood -693.486
Note: ***, **, and * denote coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of signiﬁ-
cance, respectively.
4.2 Model description
In order to estimate the market value of the real estate stock
and the value capture potential of the Lisbon subway, two
simulation procedures were developed: one for the residen-
tial market and another for the non-residential market (retail,
oﬃce, and warehouse). Figure 2 presents the initial data pro-
cessing and estimate of the attributes of each property simu-
lated in the model for the residential market, while Figure 3
illustrates the structure of the simulation model with all the
cycles and processes invoked by the simulation model. A sim-
ilar structure was adopted for the non-residential market sim-
ulation model.
For each iteration, the model generates a synthetic popula-
tion of residential properties for Lisbon based on the statisti-
cal distributions available for the census block using a Monte
Carlo simulation procedure. All the structural attributes gen-
erated from the statistical census data are considered as inde-
pendent variables with the exception of area, which depends
on the number of bedrooms generated. is simpliﬁcation as-
sumption signiﬁcantly reduces the complexity of the interrela-
tion between the diﬀerent attributes; however itmight lead to
some unreliable conﬁgurations in some low probability cases.
4.3 Results discussion
For the current study, 100 iterations for the residential and the
non-residential simulationmodelswere used. e summary of
the average values obtained from the simulation are presented
in Table 4. e resulting values show that approximately 2.5
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Figure 2: Property attributes generation of the synthetic properties model for market value estimation.
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Figure 3: Flowchart of value capture simulation model.
percent of the total residential market value is derived from
subway valuation, which is quite signiﬁcant considering that
not all the Lisbon municipality is served by the subway.
e results for the non-residential market show a higher
valuation (approximately 9 percent of the total non-
residential market value) which is derived from a higher
coeﬃcient for the subway service in the hedonic price model,
but also from the higher concentration of activities in the city
center where the subway presents a higher concentration of
stops.
e total subway valuation obtained for theLisbonmunici-
pality is approximately €2.9 billion, which would be suﬃcient
at the current prices of Lisbon’s subway construction of 40–48
kmof line (seeTable 4). is initial assessment shows the huge
potential of value capture from subway that is available for the
Lisbon municipality.
us, the obtained values are used as a reference for the fol-
lowing taxation estimates, and result in the maximum value
that could be taxed to property owners. As we are estimating
annual taxation systems, the obtained value results are an up-
per bound of the cumulative taxing revenue, considering that
20 years at current prices are equivalent to property fruition
with property price updates (discount rate of 4.96%).
5 Land value tax model
5.1 Land value tax code
Land value taxation in Portugal was reformed in 2003 with
the introduction of the Municipal Tax on Immovable Prop-
erty (IMI), which merges taxes on land and property into a
Table 4: Summary of the results of the value capture potential
simulation (all values in millions of euros).
Residential
uses
Retail, oﬃce and
warehouse uses
Total market value 61 431 148
Total subway valuation 1512 13
Total Network1 valuation −1183 −3
Total Network2 valuation 1124 7
Total Network3 valuation −701
Total Sintra valuation −65
Total Cascais valuation 46
single tax that is applied to buildings, improvements, and per-
sonal property rather than land value, being closer to a real es-
tate taxation principle.
Although this tax is not fully a land value capture mecha-
nism, due to the incorporationof physical features of theprop-
erty in its speciﬁcation, this legislation will be used as base to
develop the value capture simulationmodel for themunicipal-
ity of Lisbon,.
e IMI tax is calculated as a tax rate that is applied to the
estimated real estate value of a property. is tax rate must be
set by eachmunicipality and should range between 0.2 and0.5
percent (0.5% in the case of theLisbonmunicipality). e real
estate value is computed using a reference equation deﬁned as:
Vt =Vc ACa Cl Cq Cv (2)
whereVt is the real estate estimated value (asset value),Vc
is a base construction value per square meter established by
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Table 5: Area function coeﬃcients for IMI calculation.
Area function Coef.
Retail use 1.20
Oﬃce buildings 1.10
Dwellings 1.00
Controlled-cost dwellings 0.70
Industrial and warehouse uses 0.60
Retail and oﬃce uses in warehouse buildings 0.80
Covered enclosed parking lots 0.40
Covered open parking lots 0.15
Open parking lots 0.08
Buildings without construction permits 0.45
Storage facilities 0.35
Source:Adapted from 2003 Taxation Code.
each municipality (€615/m2 in the case of the Lisbon munic-
ipality),A is the equivalent area of the property in square me-
ters, Ca is an area function coeﬃcient, Cl is a location coeﬃ-
cient,Cq is a quality and comfort coeﬃcient, andCv is an age
correction coeﬃcient.
e equivalent area A is a new factor in urban property
valuation that aggregates the building construction area and
the exceeding area of the parcel not used for construction (see
Equation 3).
A= (Aa + 0.3Ab )C j + 0.025Ac + 0.005Ad (3)
whereAa is the private area (referring to the principal func-
tion of the autonomous fraction), Ab is the dependent area
(e.g., parking space, laundry, animal facility, attic, basement
ﬂoor),C j is the area adjustment coeﬃcient,Ac is the proxim-
ity area (vacant land area: limited to two times the construc-
tion implantation area), andAd is the distant area (vacant land
area: the area exceeding two times the construction implanta-
tion area).
e area adjustment coeﬃcient is deﬁned by a table in the
tax code, function of the valueAa+0.3Ab , and the type of use
of the property (residential, retail or services, or industrial).
e area function coeﬃcientCa depends on the type of ac-
tivity the property was developed for, or that is intended for
the property following the value presented in Table 5.
e location coeﬃcientCl depends on the type of activity
developed (housing, commerce, industry or services) and on
the kind of urban property (construction or land for construc-
tion) subject to this valuation procedure. e value of this co-
eﬃcient varies between 0.35 and 3.00, depending in several
factors as accessibility (quality and variety), proximity to pub-
lic facilities (e.g., schools, hospitals, and commerce), public
Table 6: Age correction coeﬃcient for IMI calculation.
Years since license issuance Coef.
<2 1.00
2–8 0.90
9–15 0.85
16–25 0.80
26–40 0.75
41–50 0.65
51–60 0.55
>60 0.40
Source:Adapted from 2003 Taxation Code.
transportation systems, and real estate market value. Yet, this
theoretical formulation of this factor is not translated into a
any equation and is estimated by a panel of experts.
In theory, this coeﬃcient should be highly correlated with
the value capture estimation for each city block previously es-
timated, due to the inclusion of public transport proximity as
one of the main determining factors.
e quality and comfort coeﬃcient Cq is a correction fac-
tor applied to the value inorder to account for increase in value
due to improvements and speciﬁc quality attributes of a prop-
erty or decrease in value due to lack of ordinary services (e.g.,
water and gas supply, and availability of kitchen and bath-
room in the property), as presenting parking facilities inside
the property or a swimming pool. e value of this coeﬃcient
should vary between 0.5 and 1.7.
e age correction coeﬃcientCv is a function of the num-
ber of years since the issuance of the municipal license for use,
and takes the following values:
5.2 Model description
In order to estimate the land value tax of the Lisbon munic-
ipality two simulation procedures were developed (one for
the residential market and another for retail, oﬃce, and ware-
house properties) following the same simulation principles as
the market value simulation, using a Monte Carlo simulation
and statistical data at the census block level (see Figures 2
and 3).
5.3 Results discussion
e simulation was computed with 200 iterations for the res-
idential and non-residential simulation models. A summary
of the average values obtained from the simulation is pre-
sented in Table 7. e resulting values show that approxi-
mately 55 percent of the total asset value (for residential and
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non-residential real estate stock) is derived from the location
coeﬃcient, which in theory is linked to proximity to public
transport service and facilities.
e observed total asset value of the real estate stock of Lis-
bon (approximately €23 billion) is considerably smaller than
the market value of the stock estimated by the value capture
simulation model (approximately €76 billion). is diﬀer-
ence (observed value approximately 30 percent of estimated
market value) can be explained by the considerable penalty
introduced by the age correction coeﬃcient Cv , which re-
duces the value of the considerable portion of Lisbon prop-
erties more than 60 years old to 40 percent of their original
values.
is degradation of property value due to age (see Table 6),
although also observed in the market, does not present as
signiﬁcant elasticity as in the ﬁscal estimation of the market
value. e reason behind this considerable diﬀerence is the
political decision to reduce the tax burden on building owners
of old building, who (under rent control legislation that until
recently allowed very low rent prices for old tenants), might
not have enough ﬁnancial resources to maintain their build-
ings and pay the property ownership taxes at market value
prices.
e total annual tax collection estimated would be approx-
imately €113 million. e amount of tax collected in 2009
by the municipality of Lisbon was €88 million, which is fairly
close to the estimated value; applying the actual 2009 tax rate
of 0.4 percent to the simulation model would produce annual
estimated tax revenue of €91million—adiﬀerence of less than
three percent. e estimated average tax value per property is
€296 for residential properties and €600 for non-residential
properties.
From the total asset value estimated we can see that ap-
proximately 55 percent of the total value of properties is de-
rived from the valuation of the location coeﬃcient Cl . is
fact may indicate that a signiﬁcant percentage of the value of
a property is attributable to the attributes of the surrounding
neighborhood, and (particularly considering the deﬁnition of
this coeﬃcient in the tax code), is strongly inﬂuenced by prox-
imity to subway stations.
Aer this initial assessment and estimation of the current
land value tax system, we can conclude that it might be pos-
sible to integrate this tax with the value capture of the sub-
way windfalls in order to recoup part of the property value en-
hancement to ﬁnance the subway construction and operation.
Table 7: Summary of the results of the land value tax simula-
tion by land use category (millions of euros).
Residential
uses
Retail, oﬃce
and warehouse
uses
Total asset value 17372 5287
Location coeﬃcient valuation 9497 2989
Annual tax revenue
(rate = 0.5%)
86.861 26.437
6 Modeling the introduction of an
hypothecated tax
6.1 Special assessment tax
In order to model the possible impact of an annual special
assessment tax on residential and nonresidential properties
around the Lisbon subway, we ﬁrst mapped the spatial extent
of potential value capture areas produced by the simulation
model. e results are presented in Figure 4 for the residential
market and Figure 5 for the non-residential market. ese ﬁg-
ures identify the areas where a special assessment tied to sub-
way accessibility could be applied, considering aminimumdi-
rect eﬀect of 1 percent of the totalmarket value for each census
block.
In the special assessment district, comprising all the areas
identiﬁed inFigures 4 and5, the amount charged to eachprop-
erty is not ﬁxed, but is based on market value estimates from
thehedonic pricemodel. e subway should recouponly two-
thirds of the total value derived from proximity to the subway,
in order distribute part of the increase in property values to the
private sector, as in other planning gain tariﬀs policies (e.g.,
the Socially Justiﬁed Land Use tariﬀ in Munich) (Hass-Klau
2006). e set target of two-thirds of the total estimated sub-
way proximity valuation is the maximum amount that should
be paid during the regular fruition period of a property in the
study area, which is normally more than 20 years.
In order to deﬁne a percentage of annual tax from the po-
tential value capture estimated, a database of historical real
estate prices per square meter was consulted to observe the
growth tendency of the real estate market relative to the in-
ﬂation variation. is historical database from the company
Conﬁdencial Imobiliário¹ shows a strong growth rate formar-
¹ Monthly database that collects the average asking prices of properties
in Portuguese cities since 1988. is data is used to compute a real estate
market index used by OECD for price Purchasing power parity index for
Portugal.
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ket prices from1988 to 2004 (4.06 percent on average), which
is considerably higher than the inﬂation rates from the same
period. However, in recent years this tendency of high growth
of the real estate prices in the municipality of Lisbon has been
stabilizing, presenting average values over the ﬁve last years of
3.4 percent per year. e inﬂation rate for the same periodwas
approximately 2.5 percent according to Statistics of Portugal
data, which reveals a net annual growth of approximately 0.9
percent in real estate prices.
e annual charge to property owners at this rate, applied
to two-thirds of the estimated subway valuation, will mainly
tax that portion of the expected annual increase in property
value that is derived from proximity to the subway, and not
the capital value of the property ensuring that property owners
retain a signiﬁcant share of the value of subway proximity.
Using this information, we will consider for our analysis
a time horizon of 20 years for property fruition, which will
translate the subway valuation for the next owner and a yearly
update of 0.90 percent growth of the real estate market over
the inﬂation rate.
e total annual special assessment tax for the Lisbon mu-
nicipality according to these calculations would be €17.078
million (€25.617 million if the tax were assessed against the
full value of subway proximity instead of two-thirds of the
value). Given the current cost of subway construction in Lis-
bon, this annual revenue would be suﬃcient to ﬁnance 285 m
of new subway line per year (approximately 36 percent of the
current average yearly total), or to pay 24 percent of the annual
operational deﬁcit of the subway (based on 2007 operational
deﬁcit values).
e estimated tax revenue would have a signiﬁcant impact
on the cost coverage of the subway and enhance the subway
network development with a new annual stream of ﬁnancial
resources.
e problem of this taxation policy lies in the increase of
the tax burden on property owners without a readily percepti-
ble improvement in public transport service or amenities close
to the property location. Apart from the improvement of ser-
vice in other locations, whichmay extend the public transport
network and improve general accessibility, it is hard for the
taxpayer to link the service improvement with the signiﬁcant
increase in taxation. Several studies have found that a tax in-
crease not linkedwith an improvement inurban amenities and
services can lead to lower property values and welfare losses in
the medium and long terms (Oates 1969, 1973).
is tax increasewould lead to an average increase in the tax
burden of 16.62 percent on residential properties and 22.03
percent on non-residential properties. is value represents
an average tax increment of €18 for residential properties and
€59 for nonresidential properties. e spatial distribution
of the combined tax burden increase (residential and non-
residential) is presented in Figure 6.
e obtained results suggest that this increase would be
more signiﬁcant for the nonresidential sector, especially for
properties located in the city center and around some high ac-
tivity poles inside Lisbon (see Figure 6). is could lead to
a considerable relocation of activities by ﬁrms that want to
reduce their costs, and could aﬀect the distribution of jobs
within the municipality and even the Lisbon metropolitan
area. From a transport and land use planning perspective, this
could generate signiﬁcant imbalances, creating relocations to
less accessibility in public transport areas that may aﬀect over-
all regional sustainability. e eﬀects of this imbalance should
be carefully analyzed prior to the implementation of this type
of policy, but these issues are beyond the scope of this paper.
6.2 Integration of subway value capture with current land
value tax
e integration of the existing land value tax and the subway
value capturemechanism could be performed considering two
hypotheses:
 e value capture subway tax would result in an added
charge to the current land value tax, using the same tax
rate, which would increase the tax burden of all property
owners located close to subway stations;
 Or, consider that the actual land value capture tax al-
ready includes the subway property valuation and the
value capture to ﬁnance the subway should be obtained
from the current tax collection.
e ﬁrst option, although capable of generating larger tax
revenues to ﬁnance the subway construction and operation,
leads to an increase of the tax burden to property owners with-
out any improvement of the current public transport service or
amenities close to the property location as discussed above.
Nevertheless, we have estimated the value of this tax incre-
ment to the current land value tax, considering once again
that only two-thirds of the subway upli in property prices
would be taxed and that the tax rate would be the same as
the current land value tax. e annual total tax increment
for the entire municipality of Lisbon would be €9.542 mil-
lion (€14.313million if insteadof two-thirds itwould be com-
pletely charged). is annual value would be suﬃcient at the
current price of Lisbon’s subway construction cost of building
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Figure 4: Residential market value capture potential map.
Figure 5:Non-residential market value capture potential map.
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159 m of subway line per year (the current average construc-
tion pace of the subway is 800mper year), or to pay 14 percent
of the annual operational deﬁcit of the subway (2007 subway
operational deﬁcit values).
Although the value capture revenue estimated might be in-
suﬃcient to cover the entire annual costs of the subway, it
might help to reduce the gap between operational costs and
revenues and boost the enlargement of the subway network
within the Lisbon municipality and also to the surrounding
municipalities.
is tax increment would lead to an average tax burden
increase for residential properties of 6.19 percent and 12.35
percent for non-residential properties. is value represents
an average tax increment of 48€ for residential properties and
105€ for non-residential properties. e spatial distribution
of the combined tax burden increase is presented in Figure 7,
where the city center and some high activity density poles in-
side Lisbon are again the main tax burden increase targets,
which could lead to the same relocation problems discussed
above.
e second option of integration of the subway value cap-
ture with the current land value tax is the consideration that
the current tax already contains the premium of proximity to
the subway stations. is approach encloses a tax revenue re-
assignment of part of the land value tax from themunicipality
budget to the subway operation company, Metropolitano de
Lisboa.
e transfer of part of the landvalue tax revenues to the sub-
way company would lead in this case to a political blind alley
because the subway is controlled directly by the central gov-
ernment and its funds are assigned directly from the general
national taxation system. e link between the local author-
ity and this state owned company is negligible, which would
complicate its application and raise issues about the local ﬁ-
nancing system.
However, we have estimated the value from the general tax-
ation system that should be transferred to the subway opera-
tion company in case of application of this policy. is value is
computed considering that the relation betweenmarket value
of a property and the subway value capture potential remain
unaltered with the taxation asset value of a property.
e annual total tax shi from the current land value tax
charged by themunicipality to the subway operation company
would be €4090 million (€2.007 million from the residential
sector and €2.007 million from the non-residential sector).
is tax revenue would be suﬃcient at the current prices of
Lisbon’s subway construction cost of building 64m of subway
line per year (approximately 8 percent of the current average
construction pace of the subway) or to pay 6 percent of the
annual operational deﬁcit of the subway (2007 subway opera-
tional deﬁcit values).
e estimated tax revenues to ﬁnance the subway with this
approach are considerably smaller than the previous (approx-
imately 40 percent). Nevertheless, the application of this pol-
icy would lead to some contribution toward the cost of sub-
way development and operation and reduce by only 3 percent
the revenues of the municipality, without increasing the tax
burden of property owners that could result in the relocation
eﬀects previously mentioned.
6.3 Comparison of the diﬀerent value capture
mechanisms
In this section we present general comparison of the diﬀerent
value capturemechanisms performance by considering several
indicators. ese indicators are:
1. e annual tax revenue generated by each of the pro-
posed value capture mechanisms that may be used for
ﬁnancing the subway construction and operation. is
indicator can be considered an economic eﬃciency per-
formance indicator.
2. e percentage of property owners in Lisbon aﬀected by
the introduction of each value capture mechanism. is
indicator translates the concern of equity and fairness
among the municipality property owners. At the same
time, this indicator may be considered also as a proxy in-
dicator of social acceptance.
3. e average tax burden introduced by each ﬁnancing
policy (using as a base for the land value tax the mar-
ket value of properties) that illustrates simultaneously
the economic applicability of the mechanism (excess tax
burden can raise economic eﬃciency issues and generate
severe economic activity relocation) and the social accep-
tance of its implementation.
Moreover, we should also be aware of the legal and insti-
tutional framework required for the implementation of each
policy. ere are some analyzed value capture mechanisms
that entail complementary legislation (e.g., Transportation
Utility Fees) and institutional re-arrangements (e.g., Land
Value Tax reassignment of subway value capture component
to the subway operator).
Assessing the diﬀerent indicators in Table 8, we can try to
identify themost suitable policy in light of the advantages and
disadvantages introduced by diﬀerent tested policies.
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Figure 6: Spatial distribution of the tax burden increase with the Special Assessment tax.
Figure 7: Spatial distribution of the land value tax burden increment.
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Table 8
Value Capture Mechanism
Annual Tax Revenue
(millions of euros)
Average Residential
Tax Burden
Increase (%)
Average Non-residential
Tax Burden
Increase (%)
% Property
Owners Impacted
Special Assessment Tax 17.078 11.08 22.03 46.20
Land Value Tax
(Additional Subway Component)
9.542 6.19 12.35 77.05
Land Value Tax
(Subway Component Re-assignment)
4.09 0 0 0
A ﬁrst examination of the results shows that the Special
Assessment Tax produces higher tax revenues; however, it
presents a signiﬁcant tax burden increase, especially for the
non-residential sector. eLandValueTaxwith an additional
subway value capture component may also raise a signiﬁcant
level of tax revenuewith a smaller tax burden split amongmore
taxpayers.
e obtained results also indicate that the value capture
mechanisms that introduce higher annual tax collection per
average increase in tax burden are the Land Value (Subway
Component Re-assignment), which does not present any tax
burden increase to the property owners, and the Land Value
Tax (Additional SubwayComponent) with a tax collection of
€1,542million for each 1 percent increase in tax burden. If we
use this tax eﬃciency indicator as themain selection criterion,
we might conclude that these two value capture measures are
the most suitable for the local context of Lisbon.
7 Conclusions
ispaper presents an assessment of the land value capture po-
tential of the Lisbon subway, and estimates the ﬁnancial out-
come of the creation of a value capture tax in themunicipality
of Lisbon and the possible integration of the subway real estate
windfalls in the current land value taxation system.
AMonteCarlo simulationprocedure is used to estimate the
market composition of the residential, retail, and oﬃce sectors
from aggregated census data at the city block level. is in-
formation is used to produce an estimate of the value capture
potential of the subway in the Lisbon municipality, based on
spatial hedonic pricingmodels developed in previous research
to estimate the extent towhich access to transportation infras-
tructure currently is capitalized into property prices.
e potential value capture estimate is then used to model
some diﬀerent conﬁgurations of value capture mechanism to
fund the subway operation and expansion through annual
taxes to property owners. e integration of a value capture
mechanismwith current land value tax legislation is also tested
under two possible conﬁgurations: the creation of an addi-
tional subway value capture component to the current tax, or
the consideration that the current tax does already contain this
component and this value should be reassigned to the subway
operator company.
e results obtained show that these value capture poli-
cies could signiﬁcantly increase the pace of subway network
construction and reduce the operational deﬁcit of the subway
company. Nevertheless, tax burden issues could emerge, lead-
ing to the relocation of residences and ﬁrmswithin the Lisbon
municipality, or even at the metropolitan scale. e compar-
ative analysis suggests that Land Value (Subway Component
Re-assignment) and the Land Value Tax (Additional Subway
Component) might be the most suitable options for the Lis-
bon context.
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